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PUBLIC TORT LIABILITY UNDER THE TREATY
CONSTITUTING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND
STEEL COMMUNITY COMPARED WITH
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
KLAUS KAUTZOR-SCHROEDER

t

I.
THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
NATURE AND

-

ITS OBJECTIVES,

ORGANS.

THE

TREATY Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxenburg in Paris on April 18, 1951, and in force since
July 25, 1952, represents the first major step towards economic unity
in postwar Europe.' At the same time it is also aimed against historic
rivalries which in the course of centuries have brought about setbacks
of an economic and other nature. The objectives of the Coal and Steel
Community, according to Article 2 of the Treaty,2 are "to contribute to
economic expansion, the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of living in the participating countries through
the institution . . .of a common market ....

."

To attain these objec-

tives of creating a common and competitive market, the Community,
through its organs, has been granted important powers over the coal
and steel industries of the member states. In particular, certain restrictive practices which had been hitherto used by the different countries
to protect their industries are abolished and prohibited, especially among
which are the imposition of import and export duties, restriction on prot Legal Assistant (Gerichtsreferendar), Landgericht, Stuttgart, Germany. LL.B.
1953, University of Tiubingen, Germany; Jur. D. 1955, University of Tiibingen,

Germany; LL.M. 1958, Cornell University School of Law; James Fellow, 1956
1958, Cornell University School of Law.
1. In the meantime, taking effect on January 1, 1958, two other European institutions in the economic field have been created: the European Economic Community,
designed to gradually abolish custom barriers between the six countries listed above
over a period of fifteen years, and the European Atomic Energy Community, an
organization for cooperation in the field of atomic research and its use for industrial purposes.
2. For the English translation of the Treaty Constituting the European Coal
and Steel Community, see 46 AM. J.INT'L L. Supp. 107 (1952). [Hereinafter Treaty.]

(198)
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duction, discriminatory practices concerning prices, state subsidies, and
8
measures which tend to divide the market or to exploit the customer.
InsOfar as the powers given to the Community reach, the Community is a true supranational agency in that its measures have a direct
effect upon and immediately bind the coal and steel enterprises affected
by a particular decision. The exercise of these powers is independent
of the will of the member states, which, by having become partners to
the Community, have given up jurisdiction in this particular 'field.
Because of this direct effect, there is no need for a ratification by the
member states of measures taken by an organ of the Community as
would be the case in the realm of international law.
The different functions of the Coal and Steel Community are
performed by four organs: the High Authority, the Common Assembly,
the Ministers' Council and the Court of Justice." Of these, the High
Authority (HA), as the executive organ -of the Community, exercises
by far the most important powers over coal and steel enterprises. In
order to accomplish the purposes of the Treaty, it can take direct action
with respect to production and the operation of the markets whenever
circumstances make this necessary. It is thus in a position to affect
seriously the management of an enterprise to the extent of inflicting
irreparable damage.
These extensive powers of the HA, and the great amount of discretion necessarily involved in reaching a decision in an area of fluctuating economic conditions, required the establishment of a judicial organ,
the Court of Justice, to which parties allegedly injured have access.
Before this Court, not only member states but also individual coal or
steel enterprises, or groups thereof, as well as producers' associations
(and in some instances even third parties) can appear as plaintiffs to
attack decisions of the HA.5 The supranational character of the Community is demonstrated again by the fact that the coal and steel enterprises, and other private parties, challenge the decisions of the HA as
of their own right independently of the right of their respective states.
No diplomatic protection by their government is needed, which would
be necessary under the rules of international law. 6
3. Treaty art. 4.
4. Treaty art. 7.
5. See Articles 33-36, 63(2), 66(5) of the Treaty.
6. As a consequence of the existence of independent rights both of the national
governments and individual enterprises to challenge decisions of the HA, there might
be parallel proceedings aimed against the same decision. Thus, the decisions 1/54,
2/54 and 3/54 of the HA concerning steel prices were attacked by the Italian Government and two Italian steel enterprises in separate proceedings at the same time.
See affaires no. 2/54, /354 and 4/54 in Cour de Justice de. la Communautg Europienne
du Charbon et de l'Acier, in I Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 1954-1955, 73,
123. 177. [Hereinafter cited as Recueil.]
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Another feature of supranationalism in this connection is that the
national courts are expressly denied the right to rule on the validity of
a decision of the HA; they are under an obligation to certify the issue
to the Court of Justice which shall have exclusive jurisdiction to rule
thereon.7
A reason for strengthening the position of the Court is the lack of
an adequate political control by the parliamentary organ of the Community, the Common Assembly, over the HA. The Assembly's authority is limited to a general discussion of the annual report submitted
once a year by the HA. The only way of controlling the HA is by way
of adopting a motion of censure by two-thirds of its members present
and voting, representing a majority of the membership, in which case,
the members of the HA must resign.' It is doubtful, however, whether,
apart from cases of gross and obvious abuse of its powers by the HA,

such a vote will ever be cast. In order to remedy this weakness adequate
means of control on a judicial level had to be given to the Court.
II.
THE INFLUENCE

OF NATIONAL

OF THE

COAL AND

LEGAL SYSTEMS ON

THE LAW

STEEL COMMUNITY.

Although in the last fifty years there have been some international

organizations which attempted to form economic units in certain areas,
e.g., the European Danube Commission or the International Civil Aero-

nautics Organization, one can nevertheless say that the Coal and Steel
Community poses unprecedented questions, especially the Court of Justice which, as will be shown later, exercises jurisdiction of a varied
nature, and is so unique that it does not lend itself to any traditional

categorization. The interpretors of the provisions of the Treaty will
find many questions which have never, not even under similar institutions, been posed and answered before.
However, one should not overlook the fact that the Community
is a union of certain specific nations and that the draftsmen of the Treaty
were members of these nations, being trained in their respective legal
systems. It is therefore understandable that certain principles embodied
in the Treaty were not invented by the framers but drawn from the
laws of the member states. Consequently, one is justified in going
back to the national laws in making inferences as to the meaning of a
particular provision of the Treaty which has obviously been designed
after it. This interrelation between the laws of the member states and
7. Treaty art. 41.
8. Treaty art. 24.
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certain Treaty provisions was clearly pointed out by one of the general
counsels at the Court of Justice,9 M. Lagrange, while explaining the
term d~tournement de pouvoir (abuse of discretion) found in Article 33
of the Treaty.'"
But the Court cannot simply apply the national law which comes
closest to a Treaty provision. As some authors" have rightly asserted,
the problem is not one of applying the national law of one of the member states but of applying the law of the Community.' 2 The Court will
have to create a Community law in the process of which it might very
well scrutinize the national legal systems in order to come to an adequate interpretation and solution, without, however, simply adopting
the legal view on this point of any member state. It is a task similar to
the one which, as will be seen later, the French Conseil d'I~tat had to
perform in creating, without the aid of any legislation, French administrative law in general and the law of public tort liability in particular.
The protection of private interests under the Treaty has been
strongly influenced by French administrative law. Thus, we find the
basic distinction between contentieux d'annulationin article 33, a device
for the annulment of administrative acts; and contentieux de pleine
juridiction in article 34, the procedure to obtain indemnity for damages
caused by the public administration, a distinction traditional to French
administrative, law. In the realm of the contentieux de pleine juridiction, two terms fundamental to French law of public tort liability, faute
de service (which might be translated as service-connected fault) and
faute personnelle, form the decisive criteria in article 40. Article 34,
the other provision concerning tort liability, has adopted the notion of
faute de nature d engager la responsabilitM (de la CommunautM),
which has been worked out by the Conseil d'fRtat in a long line of
cases as the basis of governmental tort liability.
This strong influence of French administrative law in the area of
tort liability justifies and makes necessary an extensive analysis of the
French law on this point, subject, of course, to what has been said
9. The institution of the general counsel (avocat gingraI) has been taken over
from the French law (there called commissaire du gouvernement, attached to the Conseil d']tat). Although not a member of the tribunal, the general counsel publicly announces his opinion and the reasons therefor at much greater length than the court,
before the latter renders its opinion.
10. In his conclusions in affaire no. 3/54, in Rzcui., 143, 149.
11. Note, 65 YALU L.J. 1227-28 (1956) ; Marsh, SupranationalPlanning Authorities and Private Law, 4 AM. J. COMp. L. 189, 190-91 (1955) ; Daig, Die ersten vier
Urteile des Gerichtshofes der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft fuer Kohle und Stahl,
JURISTENZEITUNG 361 (1955). See also RAPPORT DF LA DLUGATION FRANCAISE SUR
Lz TRAITt INSTITUANT LA COMMUNAUTt EUROPkE:Nt DU CHARBON ET DE L'AcIRR

(1951).

37

12. See generally M. Lagrange in his conclusions in affaire no. 3/54, in RscurEIr
143, 148.
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about the outright adoption of any national law for the interpretation
of Treaty provisions.
Notions of public tort liability as developed under German law
have to a much lesser degree found access into the Treaty. The reasons

for this probably lie in the fact that the French example of forming a
system of public tort liability completely separate from the rules of
private tort law was much more suited for the Community which lacks
private law rules than the German solution where governmental tort
liability is essentially based on provisions of the civil code and the federal
constitution. Nevertheless, the German law in this area will be analyzed
to a certain extent, not so much because it presents a different approach,
but primarily because some of its basic features are quite similar to the
solution under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
III.
THE BEGINNING OF PUBLIC

TORT LIABILITY IN

FRANCE

AND THE ROLE OF THE CONSEIL DI'ITAT IN
THE SUBSEQUENT

DEVELOPMENT.

In France, state liability in its first beginnings dates back to the
Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789. Before that time, France,
as well as the rest of the European states, denied any responsibilty of
the state under the theory of the absolute monarchy. A combination of
the Roman idea of imperium and feudal lordship, for which the lawyers
of the king like Bodin and Loyseau worked out the theoretical foundations, was attached to the position of the king and prevented suits in
tort against him, or the state which he represented. The prevailing
doctrine of that time was le roi ne peut faire inal, a doctrine which corresponds not only in its practical but also in its theoretical aspects to the
English principle that the king can do no wrong, later also to be adopted
in the United States.
Not only the French state but also its public officials were originally
immune from tort actions. It was only by virtue of express legislation
that they could later be sued, and then, however, only with the consent of the head of the administration (by statutes of 1789 and 1790)
or that of the Conseil d'tRtat (Article 75 of the Constitution of the
year VIII of the Revolution, i.e., 1800). Since the Conseil d'IRtat
until 1872 was a mere administrative agency, the administration
had an arbitrary power to determine whether a suit should be admitted or not. Actually, only in very few cases was consent given
to bring an action against a public official.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 2
WINTER

1958-59]

PUBLIC TORT LIABILITY

The first inroads into the theory of sovereign immunity came as
the consequence of certain ideas of the French Revolution. The Declaration of Rights of Man of 1789 established in its Article 17 the principle that private property, being an inviolable and sacred right, can
be taken only when public necessity demands it and only against the
payment of just compensation. The other idea was that of the equality
of all citizens in regard to public charges, an idea expressly proclaimed
in the same declaration. These two notions led to a system of compensation by the state in cases of eminent domain as well as in cases where
a person had suffered damages by virtue of public works undertaken
by the state.
From there, these principles were extended to all cases where
private property had been injured by administrative action, and later
to a general recognition of tort liability of the state for wrongful acts.
Landmark cases in this development will be discussed later.
At this point, attention should be given to one basic difference
between the French law of public tort liability and the situation in the
United States. In France, the change of law from a point of absolute
immunity of the state to an elaborate and far-reaching system of granting indemnity has been exclusively the work of the courts, especially
the Conseil d'etat and the Tribunal des Conflits.3 Without the aid of
any legislation, these courts have in a long line of cases created firm
principles of public tort law. It is striking that in the pioneer country
of codification the task of developing an increasingly important branch
of the law has been, and still is, left to the two highest tribunals, which,
however, have accomplished their mission in an excellent way. The
protection of the private citizen against encroachments of the public
power under French administrative law is outstanding and has served
as an example in other countries.
In the United States, on the other hand, judges have played a
rather passive and reluctant role in overcoming the outmoded concept
of sovereign immunity. In spite of the early statement by President
Lincoln in his first annual message to Congress in 1861 that "it is as
much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself
in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between private individuals", 4 most American judges have with sparse justification
applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity through the decades. Only
a few opinions appear to be off the beaten track; they point at the in13. The function of the Tribunal des Conflits is to decide whether the ordinary
(civil) courts or the administrative courts shall have jurisdiction in a given case.
14. Quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Kennecott
Copper Co. v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 573, 58C (1946).
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adequacy and injustice of the old doctrine.' 5 But certainly these few
voices could not change the law. Therefore, Congress had to move in,
enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946. Thus, we find the strange
situation that in the United States, where judges have traditionally had
a much stronger position than in France, where the law is to a large
extent judge-made, and where great changes in the law have in most instances been brought about by judicial decisions rather than by legislation, the decisive step of at least partly discarding the idea of sovereign
immunity had to be taken by way of legislation.' 6 Whereas in France,
the traditional country of codification, almost the entire development
in the direction of estate responsibility has been achieved by the courts.
IV.
LEGAL BASIS OF PUBLIC TORT LIABILITY.

A. The French System.
Since the creation of the codes by Napoleon, private tort liability
has been governed by the provisions of the civil code. Section 1 (1382)
provides in broad and sweeping language that "every act that causes
damage to another person obliges him by whose fault the damage has
occurred to make redress," and section 1384 established liability for
wrongful acts of another person on the basis of respondeat superior.
It would have been quite possible, as the idea of sovereign immunity
was losing more and more ground, to base the liability of the state for
tortious acts on these provisions of the civil code, administered by the
ordinary courts.' 7 However, the development went in a different direction. As early as 1855, the Conseil d'i~tat began to claim exclusive
jurisdiction over this area. In the Rotschild case,'" it announced that
the responsibility of the state for wrongful acts can be adjudged only
by administrative authorities since the nature of the particular branch
of the administration would have to be taken into consideration, which
15. Compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Great Northern
Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 57 (1944), with the same Justice's later
dissenting opinion in Kennecott Copper Co. v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 573, 580
(1946). See Justice Wolfe dissenting in Bingham v. Board of Education, 118 Utah
582, 593, 223 P.2d 432, 438 (1950). See also Justice Carter dissenting in Madison v.
San Francisco, 106 Cal.2d 232, 236 P.2d 141 (1951).
16. The same is true of Great Britain, where governmental liability for torts

had to be introduced by way of legislation in the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947,
10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44, § 2(1).
17. This was done in Belgium, where, however, the results of developing a
system of public tort liability have been meagre. See Trotabas, Liability in Damages
Under French Administrative Law, 12 J.CoMr. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 213, 214
(1930).
18. [1855] Sirey Recucil 707, cited in MUCH, DiE AMTSHAFTUNG IM RncHT DER
EUROPAEISCHEN GnMEINSCHAFT FUER KOHLE UND STAHL 27 (1952).
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the ordinary courts would be unable to do. This first comment found
its confirmation in the famous Blanco decision, rendered by the Tribunal
des Conflits in 1873."° This case is commonly considered to be the
most important step in the development of freeing the law of public
tort liability from the provisions of the civil code and the jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts. The whole theory of administrative law as it
exists to-day can be traced back to it. The facts in the case were that a
child had been injured by employees of a government warehouse. The
question before the Tribunal des Conflits was whether the ordinary
courts applying the provisions of the civil code should have jurisdiction
or whether this was a case to be decided by the administrative courts.
The court decided in the latter sense, using the following words:
"The responsibility which may be incumbent upon the Government for damage caused to individuals by acts of persons employed
by the Government in public service, cannot be governed by the
rules which have been established in the civil code for the relations
between individuals. Governmental responsibility is neither general nor absolute; it has its special rules which vary according to
the needs of the service and the necessity of reconciling the rights
of the Government with private rights."' s
It should be noted that the original purpose of the Blanco decision
was to free the administration from the rigorous application of the civil
code provisions, especially article 1384 establishing a strict liability
under the theory of respondeat superior. The court recognized that subjecting the government to these provisions would bring about an unsupportable burden to the public finances. It is interesting to note that
in spite of these original considerations the development has gone in the
opposite direction. The Conseil d'Itat has in the course of time
imposed liability upon the state in situations where a private citizen
would clearly not be liable under the civil code provisions.
Thus, starting in 1873 with the Blanco decision, the French law of
public tort liability has gone a separate and completely different way
from that of private tort law. The administrative courts were, from
that time on, able to build up, unhampered by any code provisions, a
system of public tort liability. It is true that in the beginning they did
so by adopting the notation of fault as the basis for liability, i.e., the
same notion used by section 1382 of the civil code. Very soon, however, its character was fundamentally changed with the gradual intro19. [1873]

Sirey Recueil 153;

[1873]

Dalloz Jurisprudence III. 17, cited by

WALINE, TRAITj ]LAMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF

576 (6th ed. 1951).

20. Id. at 158, Dalloz at 22.
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duction of the term faute de service.2 1 This term, as has been understood and applied in the last five decades in France, and fault as a civil
code term has completely different meanings. Furthermore, the Conseil d' ~tat has not only changed the contents of terms originally
adopted from the civil code, but has, for certain groups of cases,
gone further in J6asing the responsibility of the state on a theory of
absolute liability, a form unknown to the civil law.
It can be said that to-day we find two separate bodies of tort law
in France, the law of the civil code on the one hand and the public tort
law, as developed by the Tribunal des Conflits and the Conseil
d't~tat, on the other. The separation is complete; perhaps it is best
demonstrated by the fact that none of the many decisions of the
Conseil d'1ttat rendered in this area has even by way of analogy
referred to the provisions of the civil code. 2
B. The System Under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Very unlike the situation under the French law, the Federal Tort
Claims Act of 1946 (FTCA) is based on a very close connection between private tort law and public tort liability. Governmental liability
under the FTCA follows the private law rules of tort. The pertinent
provisions of the FTCA establishing this are section 2674:23 "The
United States shall be liable .. .in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances . .'.," and sec-

tion 1346(b) which gives the district courts exclusive jurisdiction in
actions against the United States, "under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
Congress thus extended the application of the rules of private tort
law to the area of governmental tort liability. This intent of Congress
was clearly spelled out in the case of United States v. Campbell:
"The whole structure and content of the FTCA makes it
crystal clear that in enacting it and thus subjecting the Government to suit in tort, the Congress was undertaking with the greatest
precision to measure and limit the liability of the Government,
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, in the same manner and
to the same extent as the liability of private persons under that
doctrine were measured and limited in the various states." 4
21. The character of faute de service will be discussed in detail at a later point.
For present purposes, it may be enough to say that the basis of faute de service is the
bad functioning of the administrative service, i.e., administrative fault.
22. MUcH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 32, citing Duvz, LA ReSPONSABILITA DV LA
PUISSANCE PUBLIQUE 18 (2d ed. 1938), and ROLLAND, PRACIS D4 DROIT ADMINISTRAIr
360 (9th ed. 1947).
23. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1952).
24. 172 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1949).
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Not very long after the enactment of the FTCA, the question arose
as to what extent governmental tort liability is based on the rules of
private law, in other words, whether the government is liable only in
those cases in which private persons have traditionally been held liable.
Thus, in Feres v. United States,2 5 the plaintiff asked for damages arising out of injuries inflicted on him by other soldiers while he was a
member of the armed forces and on active duty. The United States
Supreme Court dismissed the claim, basing its decision on the fact that
plaintiff had not been able to point even to a remotely analogous liability
under private tort law rules. In enacting the FTCA, said the Court,
Congress did not intend to create new causes of action but merely
accepted government liability under circumstances which would bring
private liability into existence. "We find no parallel liability before,
and we think no one has been created by this Act. Its effect is to waive
immunity from recognized causes of action and was not to visit the
Government with novel and unprecedented liabilities." 26
In Dalehite v. United States," a case arising out of the Texas
City explosion disaster, one of the questions was whether the federal
government was liable, under the FTCA, for negligence on the part of
the Coast Guard in fighting the fire on the burning ships loaded with
fertilizer. Citing Feres v. United States and section 2676 of the FTCA,
the Court confirmed its attitude taken in the Feres case, pointing out
that the law of torts had never recognized liability arising out of firefighting and that hence no valid claim should be made under the FTCA.
The same result was reached in National Manufacturing Co. v.
United States"8 by the Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, where a
claim had been based on the negligence of the U.S. Weather Bureau
in giving erroneous weather and flood forecasts. The court in this case
introduced the criterion underlying the Feres and Dalehite cases of
whether an activity is purely governmental or not. Negligence in
undertaking governmental activities intended for the public at large and
without any private counterpart cannot, said the court, lead to governmental liability.
Considering the holdings of these cases, it seems that the courts
have strictly adhered to the letter of the FTCA by not allowing claims
because of the absence of an analogous private counterpart for the respective activity. Starting in 1955, however, the Supreme Court has
freed itself from this strict adherence to the letter of the FTCA, thereby
25.
26.
27.
28.

340
340
346
210

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
F.2d

135 (1950).
135, 142 (1950).
15 (1953).
263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss2/2

10

Kautzor-Schroeder: Public Tort Liability under the Treaty Constituting the European
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 4 : p. 198

overruling the line of cases beginning with Feres v. United States.
The turning point in this development was the case of Indian Towing
Co. v. United States,29 where suit was brought for the loss of cargo
which occurred when a tug ran aground because of the negligence of
the Coast Guard in the inspection and repair of a lighthouse. The
government, relying on the Feres and Dalehite cases, contended that
the language of the FTCA must be read as excluding liability for
negligence in the performance of activities which private persons do not
undertake. This argument, hitherto firmly established, was rejected by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the majority opinion. The criterion of
purely governmental activity and the absence of an analogous private
counterpart was abandoned by the Court :
[I]f the United States were to permit the operation
of private lighthouses -

not at all inconceivable -

the Govern-

ment's basis of differentiation would be gone and the negligence
charged in this case would be actionable . . . all governmental

activity is inescapably 'uniquely governmental' in that it is performed by the Government .... On the other hand, it is hard to

think of any governmental activity on the 'operational level' .. .
which is uniquely governmental in the sense that its kind has not at
one time or another been, or could not conceivably be, privately
performed."'"
The Court came to the conclusion that:
"There is nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that
Congress intended to draw distinctions so fine-spun and capricious
as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind of adequate
formulation." 3
The only other case to be mentioned here, 83 Rayonnier v. United
States, 4 involved the same problem as the Dalehite case, namely
liability of the government for negligence in firefighting. After stating
that the Dalehite case, insofar as it had clung to private tort law concepts, had been overruled by the Indian Towing case, the Supreme
Court continued in a rather bold and fearless way:
"It may be that it is 'novel and unprecedented' to hold the
United States accountable for the negligence of its firefighters, but
29. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
30. Id. at 66-68.
31. "How about the task of the executioner?" asks Davis, Tort Liability of

Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L.R. 751, 788 (1956).
32. 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955).
33. Several lower courts at that time discarded the Feres-Dalehite doctrine.
See for example, Kirk v. United States, 232 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Air Transport
Associates v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Bulloch v. United States,
133 F.Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955).
34. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
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the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and
to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability. '13
With these last two decisions, the Supreme Court has to a certain
extent introduced new concepts into the law of public tort liability, thus
leaving the ground of private tort law. It remains to be seen in which
direction the future development will go. Will the Supreme Court disregard the express command of the FTCA that public tort liability
shall not go further than liability of private persons under the private
tort law rules, and build up, like the Conseil d'iRtat in France, a new
and completely separate body of law for government claims cases
which is not merely an extension of private tort law? The Indian
Towing case and especially the Rayonnier case seem to be a first
step in this direction.
C. The German System.
German law concerning public tort liability follows a similar pattern as that of the FTCA. The legal basis of the responsibility of the
state for torts committed by its agents is a provision of the German
civil code, section 839, together with Article 34 of the federal constitution.8 ' Section 839, at the time of its taking effect on January 1, 1900,
having brought about a uniform regulation of public tort liability,
provides:
"(1) If a public official intentionally or negligently violates
his official obligation towards a third person, he is liable for the
ensuing damages to this third person. .

.

It should be noted that this section, though setting up special standards
for the liability of public officials (especially in regard to negligence),
is one of the provisions of private tort law, to be found under the chapter
"Torts" of the civil code.
The direct liability of the public official has, as early as 1909 in
Prussia 37 and in 1910 in the Reich," been taken over by the state by way
of legislative provisions. The same thing was done by Article 131 of
35. Id. at 319. On the other hand, the Supreme Court still recognizes that local
state law governs. United States v. Sharpnack, 78 Sup. Ct. 291, 297 (1958) ; 3

VILL. L. Rgv. 558 (1958).
36. For an analysis of the historical development of public tort liability in
Germany, see Braband, Liability in Tort of the Government and Its Employees, 33
N.Y.U.L. Ri~v. 18, 32 (1958).
37. Law of August 1, 1909, [1909] G.S. 691 (Prussia).
38. Law of May 22, 1910, [1910] REIcHSG9STZvLATT 798 (Germany).
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the Weimar Constitution of 1919."0 Article 34 of the present federal
constitution, 40 now the only applicable provision, states:
"If any person, in exercising the duties of a public office entrusted to him, violates his official obligation to a third party,
liability shall in principle rest with the state or his employing
agency ......
The effect of basing governmental tort liability on this combination of legal provisions is that liability of the state can only arise if a
public official would be liable under section 839 of the civil code. In
this situation, the state assumes in lieu thereof the liability which
originally accrued to the person of the official by virtue of article 34
of the constitution. This means that a suit can only be brought against
the state and not against the official. The legal basis on which the
presence or absence of the state's liability is adjudged is, however,
section 839. This means that if the public official is not liable under
section 839 of the civil code, the state is equally not liable under article
34 of the constitution. Article 34, in other words, presupposes that all
requirements of section 839 are fulfilled. The use of the word liability
in article 34 is generally considered to point to an already existing
liability under section 839 which is then taken over by the state.
The similarities between the American and German solution are
obvious by now. Disregarding for a moment the recent development in
the Indian Towing and the Rayonnier cases, and taking only the provisions of the FTCA, it can be said that both systems are ultimately
based on the rules of private tort law. The pertinent provisions of the
FTCA as well as Article 34 of the German constitution presuppose the
existence of a valid claim under those rules and merely transfer liability
over to the state. It is true that German law puts great emphasis on
the existence of liability of a public official, whereas the FTCA finds
the decisive criterion in an analogous liability of a private person under
like circumstances. This, however, is only a consequence of the fact
that American law has never, for purposes of tort liability, made a distinction between private citizens and government employees, subjecting
the latter, insofar as they could be sued at all, to the general rules of tort
law; whereas German law in section 839 of the civil code has established
a special provision for claims against public officials. This does not
change the basic conclusion that the FTCA and German law stand, in
39. Weimar Const. of 1919 art. 131 (Fisk transl. 1924).
40. Provisional Const. of the Federal Republic of West Germany of 1949 art.
34 (U.S. Dept. of State, Pub. No. 3526, transl. 1949).
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their theoretical aspects and, as will be seen, also in their practical
aspects, very close together, whereas French law follows completely
different concepts.
V.
JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING
PUBLIC TORT LIABILITY.

A. France.
The importance of the Blanco decision has not been limited to the
substantive side of the law of public tort liability. Preceded by the
Rotschild case in 1855,41 the Blanco decision42 clearly announced the
principle that only the administrative authorities, i.e., the Conseil
d'] tat, are competent to rule on questions arising out of the separate body of public tort law. From that time on, not the ordinary
courts, but only the Conseil d'etat can decide tort claims against
the government, as well as other claims where the government is
involved. The idea behind this was not only the belief that the
judges of the ordinary courts, brought up under and used to the
system of the civil code, would not be able to effectively adjudge
cases arising out of the new and growing area of governmental
activities, but also the concept of separation of powers. This last
consideration was brought out in the Pelletier case,4" which was
decided by the Tribunal des Conflits shortly after the Blanco case
in 1873. An action for damages was brought before the ordinary
courts against an army general who, acting within the scope of -his
authority, had confiscated certain newspapers. The general questioned
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and brought the case before the
Tribunal des Conflits. This court decided that, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, ordinary courts are incompetent to decide cases
where they would necessarily have to adjudge the regularity of administrative acts. This would be the case whenever a public official is sued
for a fault committed in the exercise of his functions. Where, either
in a suit against the state or a government employee, the question arises
whether a particular administrative act is infected with fault, the Conseil
d'tat, being part of the administrative power, would have to take
jurisdiction. Only in cases where the damage is the result of the personal fault of the employee do the ordinary courts applying the provisions of the civil code have jurisdiction."
41. See note 18 supra.

42. See note 19 supra.
43. [1874] Sirey Recuel 2, 28, cited in MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 29.
44. The court here for the first time made the distinction, although not using
these terms, between faute de service and personal fault, a distinction which has
become vital in the French law of public tort liability.
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This duality in the French court system necessitated the establishment of a tribunal which would decide the question whether the ordinary courts or the Conseil d'Rtat is competent to decide a case. This
function is performed by the Tribunal des Conflits, first established in
1848. Its nine members consist'of three judges chosen from the Cour
de Cassation, the highest ordinary court, three from the Conseil
d't~tat and two others chosen from these six; the ex officio president is the Minister of Justice. This tribunal has not limited itself
to the bare announcement that a given case belongs to the jurisdiction of one or the other branch, but has, as the Blanco and Pelletier
decisions show, to an essential degree contributed to the development of French administrative law.
B. United States.
No problem of separation of powers between ordinary and administrative courts exists under the provisions of the FTCA. This is a
consequence of the fact that public tort law under the FTCA is based
on the general rules of private tort law and is not a separate branch of
the law. Therefore, no special courts have had to be set up. Accordingly, section 1346(b) provides that the district courts, sitting without
a jury, shall have jurisdiction over tort claims against the government. The query raised by Street4 5 (referring to the institution of the
equity courts and their successful history) whether the courts entrusted
with the development of this new body of law should not be special
tribunals untrammeled by private law concepts, can, at least under the
FTCA, be answered by the Act's general attitude that public tort
liability is to follow the rules of private tort law and that therefore no
special courts are necessary. How desirable it would be to create a
separate body of law, to be administered by a special court, similar to
that for contractual liability of the government in the Court of Claims,
and whether the holdings of the Indian Towing case and the Rayonnier
case indicate a first step in this direction, cannot be forecast at this time.
C. Germany.
As in France, there exists in Germany the division between ordinary and administrative courts,4 6 the latter having jurisdiction where
the government in its official capacity is a party to a litigation. Nevertheless, the ordinary courts traditionally have had, and still have, juris45. Street, Tort Liability of the State: The FTCA and the Crown Proceedings

Act, 47 Micr. L. Rv. 341, 367-68 (1949).

46. Besides these, there are other specialized courts, such as tax courts, labor
courts and a patent court.
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diction over tort claims against the government. Article 34 of the
federal constitution expressly provides that "with respect to the claim
for damages ....

appeal to the ordinary courts must not be excluded."

This is one of the consequences of the fact that tort claims arising out
of wrongful acts of public officials were originally considered to be
directed against these particular officials based upon a provision of the
civil code and to be brought before the ordinary courts. When at a
later date the state assumed liability in lieu of the official, the jurisdictional side of the problem remained untouched, even though, especially
after 1948, there have been strong voices in favor of conferring jurisdiction over cases of governmental tort liability on the administrative courts.4" This, however, would require a change of the federal
constitution.
D. The European Coal and Steel Community.
Leaving the analysis of the substantive aspect of public tort liability
in the Coal and Steel Community for a later discussion, it seems adequate at this point to show certain similarities on the procedural side
between the American system and the system under the Treaty Constituting the Coal and Steel Community.
Under the Treaty, there is only one court, the Court of Justice,
which decides all litigations which may arise. A definition of the nature
of the Court in traditional terms seems to be impossible and will
not be attempted here. 48 In the area of tort liability, the Court has
jurisdiction not only over suits against the Community, but also
over suits against individual employees of the Community guilty
of a personal fault. This is so in spite of the fact that the French
law of public tort liability, which has been followed by the Treaty,
confers jurisdiction in the first group of cases on the Conseil d']tat
whereas in the second group the ordinary courts have jurisdiction.
Difficulties which arose under the French system out of the fact that
ordinary courts and the Conseil d'Itat can both have jurisdiction
over the same case, are thus avoided in the Community. It also
follows that the Court will have to apply not only law of an administrative nature (in tort suits against the Community), but also
rules of private tort law 49 (in suits against individual employees
for personal fault).
47. See, for example, Heidenhain, Die Amtshaftung in der Bundesrepublik, in
NEuz JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 841 (1949).
48. For example, see Ludovici, La Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice de la
C.E.C.A., 60 Rkvui: GLNERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 111, 112 (1956):
"... la Cour de Justice est une institution sui generis, qui ne trouve sa place dans
aucune des categories pr~existantes."
49. What the contents of this private law will be is still completely open.
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It can be said, therefore, that the solution of the jurisdictional
problem in the Coal and Steel Community generally, and for the area
of public tort liability in particular, shows much greater. similarity to
the American system where the same courts apply both private and
public law (leaving the jurisdiction of state courts out of consideration), than to the French system where different law is applied by
different courts. German law confers on the ordinary courts jurisdiction over claims arising out of governmental (as distinguished from
fiscal) activities of the state only in exceptional cases, e.g., in the area of
public tort law. This is to that extent an exception to the general rule
on the European continent that different, highly specialized courts
apply different law." This rule applies only to a limited extent to the
United States where, apart from a few specialized tribunals' like tax
courts or the Court of Claims, the great bulk of litigation, including
tort claims, is still handled by the ordinary courts. The rule does not
apply at all to the Coal and Steel Community where the Court of
Justice is the only judicial authority to decide litigations, whatever
form they may take and whatever law has to be applied.
VI.
BASIC

FEATURES

AND DIFFERENCES

IN

THE SUBSTANTIVE

LAWS OF PUBLIC TORT LIABILITY OF
THE THREE COUNTRIES.

A. Faute de Service and Faute Personnelle in France.
The most prominent feature which arose out of the separate development of public tort law in France, beginning With the Blanco
decision, was the introduction of the terms faute de service and faute
personnelle. The first decision to be based on this distinction, although
not yet using these technical terms, was the Pelletier case. However,
as has been shown, this case and other cases following turned primarily
on the jurisdictional aspect of the problem, stating that under the theory
of separation of powers the ordinary courts can not have jurisdiction
where a scrutiny of the functioning of the administrative service has
to take place. The Conseil d'Itat has only gradually shifted the
operation of this distinction over to the substantive side. Faute de
service no longer served as a merely negative criterion for the purpose of excluding the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, but it be50. The German Federal Constitution provides for six highest federal appellate
courts: a Constitutional Court (art. 92) and courts of ordinary, administrative, finance,
labor and social jurisdiction (art. 96), the court of ordinary jurisdiction. being
divided into permanent civil and criminal panels. Besides these, there exists a highest
federal patent court.
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came a concept with positive content and thus the basis of governmental tort liability. The last step in this direction was taken by
the Conseil d'tItat in the Tomaso Greco case" where the court for
the first time expressly used the term faute de service as a positive
test for the liability of the government.
Faute de service is, as even a member of the Conseil d'ttat has
admitted,5" a term which is almost impossible to define precisely. One
of the reasons is that the Conseil d' ~tat itself has never tried to set
up general criteria for the use of the term. Instead, the Court has
preferred to proceed by deciding each case on its own merits, thus
preserving to itself considerable freedom for different adjudications
of later cases.
Faute de service has, as has been mentioned before, no similarity
to the fault as used in the civil code. Its most important characteristic
is that it does not have to have any connection with the fault of a
particular, identifiable government employee. It is enough to show a
generally improper operation of the administrative service to which the
damage can be imputed. Faute de service is thus essentially anonymous
in character. It is the service that is adjudged, not any of its agents.
Even where there is negligence on the part of an individual, liability
of the state is not the consequence of that negligence but rather the
government's own fault shown by the mauvais fonctionnement du service. A good description of faute de service has been given by Teissier.5"
The two cases commonly given as illustrations of the anonymous
character of the faute de service are the Anguet54 and the Auxerre5 5
cases. In the Anguet case the public doors of a post office building were
locked before a customer completed his business. He was asked to
leave through a door reserved for letter carriers. There, he got into an
argument with two letter carriers who expelled him forcibly, injuring
his leg. The government disclaimed responsibility on the ground that
the cause of the injury had been the personal fault of its employees. The
Conseil d'] tat, however, decided that, irrespective of the personal
liability of the letter carriers, the government was liable under the
aspect of faute de service which consisted of the bad functioning
of the public service, namely the fact that some employee had advanced the hands of the clock in the post office thus causing the
premature closing of the building, which in a well-operated service
51. [19051 Recueil 139, cited by MucI, op. cit. supra note 18, at 30.
52. ODENT, CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATiF 475 (1954).

53. TEisSIER, LA RESPONSABILTE DE LA PUISSANCE PUBLIQUE 49 (1906), cited
in MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 33.
54. [1911] Recueil 146, cited by MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 33-34.
55. [1905] Recueil 165, cited by MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 34.
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should not occur, and the further fact that there had been a projection at the door on which the plaintiff got injured, again a defect
which should not exist in a well-managed operation. The court considered it to be completely irrelevant to inquire who had advanced
the clock or who had ordered or tolerated the projection at the
door-sill.
In the Auxerre case a soldier had been killed in a manoeuver by
the discharge of a gun, by an "enemy" soldier, which had been loaded
instead of containing only a blank cartridge. It could not be determined
who had fired the shot or who was responsible for mixing the loaded
cartridge with the blank ones. Nevertheless, the Conseil d'tPtat
held the government liable since this accident was the consequence
of a faute de service.
Faute de service is, as these examples may have shown, fault of the
administration as a technical unit, regardless of whether it can be
traced to the act of an individual employee or not, and regardless of
whether this employee is also liable or not. This implies that a legal
entity like the state, having the character of a fictitious person, can
commit a fault, an implication which is generally accepted by French
legal writers. Only Waline56 denies such a possibility. He bases the
liability of the state on a theory of guarantee by the state for its employees. This view seems to be supported, as will be seen later, by the
theory of combination of liabilities developed by the Conseil d'IRtat.
Faute personnelle, on the other hand, is the personal fault of a
government employee for acts committed either upon the occasion or
in the execution of a public function. They make him personally liable
before the ordinary courts which apply the provisions of the civil code.
No problems exist where the tort is a purely private act, bare of any
official character, e.g., where a policeman off duty injures another person with his gun. Real difficulty arises in those cases where an employee commits a tort in the execution of his official functions. This
may be a faute de service if it reveals the defective functioning of the
administrative service, but is the employee, apart from that, also personally liable? French legal writers have attempted to determine this
question by setting up certain criteria. Thus, Laferriere57 said that if
the act is impersonal, if it shows an administrator more or less subject
to error rather than a man with his weaknesses, his passions and his imprudences, the act remains administrative and cannot entail the personal liability of the employee. Jeze 58 stated that wilfullness, malice
DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIv 579 (6th ed. 1951).
57. LAFERRIARE, I TRAIT] DE LA JURISDICTION FT DES RECOURS CONTENTIEUX
648 (2d ed. 1896), cited in SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATiVE LAW AND THE
COMMON-LAW WORLD 259 (1954).
58. Cited in SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 57, at 259.
56. WALINE, TRAITA PLkMtNTAIRE
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or gross negligence on the part of the employee in inflicting damages
would present personal fault. But although mentioning certain groups
of cases which come under the category of faute personnelle, these definitions are not precise nor all-embracing.
Much,59 after having analyzed the pertinent decisions of the Tribunal des Conflits, finds two criteria running through all these cases the intent of the acting employee and the degree of fault. As to the
former, Much states that where a government official has acted bona
fide in performing his official functions and in the course of this action
has injured someone, personal liability would have to be denied. Where,
on the other hand, he injures someone, though under cover of his official
functions, for purely personal reasons, e.g., revenge, the official would
be personally liable. This situation may be illustrated by the Prefet de
la Gironde case6" where a mayor, authorized to post a list of qualified
voters on a public bulletin board, maliciously posted alongside of it the
notice that a certain person, namely his political opponent in the campaign, was bankrupt and therefore disqualified as a voter. This was
considered by the court to be a malicious act, bare of any official character, for which the mayor was personally responsible.
The second criterion found by Much is the degree of fault involved.
Personal liability has been assumed in cases where the fault of the employee exceeded the normal degree of carelessness and error which
occurs in every public administration. This includes not only criminal
acts and intentional infliction of injuries, especially when motivated by
malice, revengefulness, or hostility against a certain person, but also
cases of gross negligence.
B. The Requirement of a Definite Act of Particular
Employee Under the FTCA.
To the FTCA, taking a much more conservative attitude in the
area of public tort liability than that of the French law, the idea that
the administration itself can commit a wrongful act - that the bad
functioning of the administrative machinery can provide the basis for
state liability - is unknown. The approach under the FTCA is radically different from the French concept of faute de service. In following
the rules of private tort law, the FTCA requires the existence of some
definite act or omission on the part of a specific individual employee.
Tort liability is, as United States v. Campbell6' has pointed out, based
59. MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 71-73.
60. [1899] Dalloz 3, 93, cited in MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 71.
61. 172 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1953).
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on the doctrine of respondeat superior which requires proof of some
specific wrongful act.
The question whether under the FTCA it is enough for a plaintiff
to allege negligence on the part of the United States in general terms
came up for the first time in Sickmann v. United States.6 2 Plaintiff
sued for damages arising out of the destruction of his crops by migratory birds protected from shooting by the Migratroy Bird Treaty Act.
The court dismissed the claim on the ground that plaintiff, rather than
showing lack of due care by an employee of the United States, had
merely in general terms charged negligence on the part of the United
States acting through Congress, which under the FTCA was not
sufficient.
A very clear pronouncement of this rule can be found in the In re
Texas City Disaster Litigation.6" Plaintiff had alleged negligence of
the United States, describing the United States in broadest terms,6 4 but
without citing any particular employee. The court held this insufficient,
saying:
"The event around which the entire statute is built, is an 'act
or omission of an employee of the Government'.

. .

. The necessity

of some definite act of commission or omission on the part of
some particular employee or employees of the Government as a
predicate for its liability is emphasized by the requirement of Section 1346(b) that liability be determined in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
One of the reasons for dismissing the claim was that:
"Plaintiffs . . . failed to charge any specific negligence or

wrongful act or omission against any particular employee or agent
of the United States, simply resting on their eighty averments of
negligence on the part of the United States as such."6
The Sickmann and especially the Texas City Disaster Litigation
cases, followed by other decisions,67 have made it clear that under the
provisions of the FTCA, liability of the government for fault of the
administrative service, regardless of whether the acting employee is at
fault or not, does not exist. The requirement that there must be a
wrongful act or omission excludes this possibility.
62. 184 F.2d 616, 619-20 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951).
63. 197 F.2d 771, 776 (5th Cir. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Dalehite v. United States,

346 U.S. 15 (1953).

64. The United States, all its agencies, executive departments, etc.
65. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 776 (5th Cir. 1952). Also
see note 35 supra.
66. Ibid.
67. Goodwill Industries v. United States, 218 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1954); United
States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1953).
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The procedural strictness of this principle has, however, been mitigated by the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur in this area.
This rule is based on negligence which is inferred from all the circum-

stances producing the injury, plus a failure of the party who controlled
the destructive force to come forward with evidence peculiarly within
its knowledge rebutting the inferences of negligence."8 In the case of
United States v. Hull, 9 this rule was applied in a situation where a
post office window had fallen on plaintiff's hand while she was sliding
money across the counter. Plaintiff merely alleged negligence of the
defendant, its agents, servants or employees. The court held that under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur it was rational to infer from the sudden and unexplained falling of the window that the accident was
attributable to some negligent or wrongful act or omission of defendant's employees. Therefore, a merely general allegation of negligence was held sufficient:
"Of course it is unnecessary

.

.

for the plaintiff to estab-

lish just which employee was at fault, and in what specific respect. It is enough if the trier of the facts is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the injury was due to some negligent
act or omission of some employee. ..
The importance of the rule of res ipsa loquitur, as applied in the
Hull case, is that a plaintiff in a tort suit against the government does
not have to allege which particular employee has committed the wrongful act. If he has prima facie evidence establishing the existence of such
an act about which all the information is in the hands of the government, and the government does not rebut the prima facie evidence,
the existence of a wrongful act committed by a particular employee
or employees will be presumed. 1 Theoretically, this solution seems to
comply with the letter of the FTCA in that a definite act of a particular employee is at least presumed. In its practical consequences,
however, it comes very close to a recognition of liability like the one in
France under the concept of faute de service and defective functioning
of the administrative service. It is sufficient if the claimant alleges in
general terms negligence on the part of the government and its employees; the court is then under no obligation to trace the liability to
68. See United States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955).
69. 195 F.2d 64 (lst Cir. 1952).
70. Id. at 66.
71. It should be noted, however, that the applicability of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur in the area of public tort law is a question of state law. This means that
the rule can be applied only in cases where the law of torts of the respective state
recognizes its existence and applicability. This is done in most of the states. See
PROSSER, TORTS

§§ 42-43 (2d ed. 1955).
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the act of a particular employee but merely assumes the presence of
such an act. This is essentially the same thing which happens in France
when a suit based on faute de service is brought against the government; the only difference is that no assumption as to any particular
wrongful act is made. But this is merely, under the rule of res ipsa
loquitur, a theoretical difference, easily relied upon by a court but certainly of no practical importance.
It seems therefore that if United States v. Hull should be followed,
and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as there applied should be generally accepted by the courts, 2 the distinction in procedure, though not
in the theoretical basis, between cases where claimants can introduce
prima facie evidence in suits under the FTCA and suits based on faute
de service, would vanish, leading to a great similarity between originally completely different forms of procedure in their practical consequences. It remains to be seen in what direction this development
will go.
C. Similar Solution in Germany.
Before going into a discussion of the situation under present
German law, it is interesting to note that at the time when state liability for torts was first recognized, i.e., at the beginning of this century, the prevalent theory forming the basis of this liability was that
the state, as well as other legal entities (e.g., corporations), is liable
by virtue of its own fault and not that of its employees. This so-called
Organtheorie, developed by Otto von Gierke, had a striking similarity
to the French concept of faute de service in that in both cases the role of
the particular wrongdoing employee is neglected and fault is imputed
directly to the state.
Although this view had its merits in introducing primary rather
than auxiliary state liability into German law," it has been abandoned
since. German law is, as has been pointed out, based on a system
whereby the state assumes the liability originally accrued in the person
of the employee. It presupposes that the employee would be liable
under section 839 of the civil code. Since this provision, like the rules
of private tort law generally, requires a specific wrongful act on the
part of a particular person, governmental liability can equally be based
only on such a specific act.
72. United States v. Hull was preceded by a decision of a district court in 1951,
Parcell v. United States, 104 F.Supp. 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1951), where the court,
relying on res ipsa loquitur, assumed negligence in the collision of two Air Force
planes flying in formation, either due to negligent acts of the pilots or due to defects
in the mechanical conditions of the planes. No attempt was made to find out which
factor caused the collision and whose negligence was involved.
73. See MucH, op. cit supra note 18, at 38.
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However, as in the United States under the Hull case, German
courts have created certain rules of evidence under which claimants do
not necessarily have to point to a particular employee and the wrongful
act committed by him. Thus, the Reichsgericht 4 has deemed it sufficient for the presentation of a claim if the plaintiff merely alleged facts
from which the existence of a wrongful act of a particular employee
could be inferred without difficulty; the allegation and proof of which
particular employee was involved was held unnecessary. A justification
7
for this practice was given in another decision of the Reichsgericht
where the court reasoned that the citizen is forced by the state to deal
with public officials who are unknown to him; that it is therefore only
just and fair that the government which knows or ought to know its
employees furnishes, if necessary, information about the person of the
particular employee to the injured, and not vice versa. If in a particular
case it is impossible to ascertain the identity of an employee, the detrimental consequences arising out of this fact should not be borne by the
claimant but by the administration, the defective management of which
has caused such impossibility.
The Reichsgericht in this decision used a term, namely, a defective
functioning of the service, very similar to the one on which faute de
service in France is based. However, this factor does not become, as
in France, the basis of governmental liability. The basis remains the
wrongful act of some employee. All that the decision says is that if the
state, because of the defective management of its service, can not ascertain the identity of the employee, the consequences arising out of this
fact shall be borne by the state itself.
Nevertheless, this line of decisions has great practical importance.
All the claimant has to do is to present the facts known to him from
which the court will infer the presence of some wrongful act of an employee, regardless of whether the government is able to furnish detailed
information about the person of the employee or the specific act involved. This is essentially the same solution as under the Hull case.
The development under the FTCA and the Hull case on the one hand
and that under German law as applied by the Reichsgericht on the
other are strikingly similar in that the presence of a specific act of an
identifiable employee is required by the statutory provisions in both
cases, and in both cases courts have applied rules of evidence which
mitigated the strict requirements for a claimant to allege and prove, and
for a court to establish, the existence of such an act. What has been
74. MucI, op. cit. supra note 18, at 39.

75. Ibid.
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said above about the decreasing difference on the practical side between
tort claims under the FTCA and faute de service claims therefore
applies equally to German law.
D. Varying Standards for the Degree of Fault
Under the Decisions of the Conseil d'I tat.
One of the consequences of the holding of the Blanco case (i.e.,
governmental responsibility is neither general nor absolute; it has its
special rules which vary according to the needs of the service) is a
lack of a uniform standard for the degree of fault. This is considered
to be one of the most important features of the concept of faute de
service which distinguishes it from the notion of fault under the civil
code. The Conseil d' tat has stressed the fact that the element of
fault in the faute de service cannot be brought on a common denominator, that each case has to be decided on its own merits, i.e.,
according to the respective branch of the administration as well as
the time, place and other circumstances involved in the case. All
the Conseil d'Rtat was willing to do was to recognize the existence
of certain groups of cases to which an identical standard of fault
can be applied. Thus, the court sometimes requires faute simple,
sometimes faute lourde, the latter especially in cases where functions of the police are involved. For instance, excessive delay of
the police (over two years) in assisting a sheriff in executing a
judgment of eviction,1 failure to enforce fire regulations for movie
theatres even after the police had been advised that the performances were dangerous," the taking of steps harmful to a company
in a labor dispute in order to prevent disturbances between strikers
and workers willing to work,"8 were cases where faute lourde was
required. Other categories of fault set up by the Conseil d' tat are
faute exceptionnelle et d'une particuligregravitg, applied during periods
of national emergencies, e.g., the time of the retreat of the French army
in 1940," o and faute manifeste et particuligrententgrave for suits against
the government brought in the colonies.
Very often, the Conseil d'i~tat has refused to bring a case under
any of these categories at all by simply stating that there was a faute de
service de nature a' engager la responsabilit6 de l'Itat. This
clause, which has been taken over by the Treaty Constituting the
76. Sieur Braut, [19431 Recueil 19, cited in Jacoby, Federal Tort Claims Act

and French Law of Governmental Liability, 7 VAND. L. Rnv. 246, 264 (1954).

77. Ville de Perpignan v. Dame Dalbiez, [1943] Recueil 218, cited in Jacoby,
supra note 76, at 246, 265.
78. Compagnie nouvelle des sucreries reunies, [19441 Recueil 32, cited by Jacoby,

supra note 76, at 265.

79. See for example, Finidori, [1944] Recueil 254 (loss of personal belongings
of employee of army store), cited in Jacoby, supra note 76, at 264, note 120.
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European Coal and Steel Community, allows the court, not being
bound by any strict rule, the utmost of discretion in deciding whether, on the merits of a given case, the state should pay reparation
or not. This discretion has, as Street observes,"0 been wisely exercised by the Conseil d'Etat in order that justice be done.
E. Combination of Liabilities Under French Law.
A wrongful act of a government employee inflicting damages on a
private person may be based on personal fault of this employee and also
on faute de service at the same time. For instance, if an automobile
accident is caused by both the drunkenness of the driver of a government vehicle and the poor condition of the brakes, the driver as well as
the state would be liable. This, as will be shown at a later point, has
not always been the law. Until the beginning of this century, the Conseil d'Itat had held that faute de service and faute personnelle
were mutually exclusive. From 1909 on,8 ' however, this old theory
was not applied. Under present law, the possibility of a coexistence
of liability of the employee for personal fault and of the state for
faute de service in some cases, or under a theory of guarantee in
other cases, is now generally accepted. Two different groups of
cases must be distinguished:
The first group involves situations where both faute de service and
personal fault are present. Reference can be made to the Anguet case
discussed above, where the premature closing of the post office and the
existence of a projection at the door sill had been the bases for assuming faute de service by the Conseil d']tat. Besides that, the letter
carriers who had expelled the claimant had also been held liable in
a procedure before the ordinary courts. A combination of faults
can also be based upon one and the same act, for instance in a case
where a non-commissioned officer had not only failed to prevent
excessive acts of his soldiers but even participated in them. 2
Liability of the state in these cases is based on the mere existence
of a faute de service, regardless of whether the employee has acted within
or outside the scope of his authority.
In the second group of cases, only a personal fault is present which,
however, flows from an act committed by the employee in the course of
performing his official functions. In the absence of a faute de service,
that act forms the basis of the state's liability.
80. STREET, GOVERNMFNTAL LIABILITY:

A

COMPARATIVE

STUDY

60 (1953).

81. Starting with the decision of the Conseil d'Rtat in Compagnie Commerciale
de Colonisation du Congo, [1909] Sirey Recueil 153, cited in MUCH, op. cit.
supra
note 18, at 75-76.

82. Todiman, [1948] Recueil 82, cited by MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 75.
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Two cases may serve to illustrate this. In Compagnie Commerciale
de Colonisation du Congo,8 3 an administrative official had without any
justification interfered with the recruitment of native labor, thus inflicting severe damage upon the company. The Conseil d' Rtat held
the government liable for these acts, stating that even though they
constituted a personal fault of the official, they were nevertheless
done by an agent of the government in the exercise of his official
functions and thus of a character to involve state liability.
A famous case in this connection is the Lemonnier case,"4 decided
by the Conseil d'Rtat in 1918, which arose out of a local carnival in a
French community. Its main attraction was a shooting contest, with
the target floating on the river. Plaintiff, while walking in the vicinity,
was struck by a bullet. The contest had continued even after other persons had informed the mayor that they had almost been hit while walking in the area. The Conseil d'Rtat, holding the state liable, gave
the following reasons:
"The fact that the accident was the result of a fault of an
administrative official. . . of such a character as to involve the personal liability of the official .

.

. and even the fact that the official

has already been found liable, cannot deprive the victim of the accident of the right to bring a direct action against the public authority
concerned for the reparation of the injuries suffered."
Even more information can be gathered from the conclusions of the
commissaire du gouvernement, s5 M. Blum, in this case:
"If it [i.e., the official's personal fault] has been committed
in the administrative service, if the means and instruments to commit the fault have been put at the disposition of the official by the
service, if the victim has only by virtue of the administrative service been brought into contact with the official, if, in a word, the
service has provided the conditions for the commission of the fault
and its injurious consequences to a given individual . . . . the injured ... can bring an action against the administrative service."

Liability of the state in the cases so far discussed were based on
the fact that the personal fault had been committed within the scope of
the official's authority. With three decisions rendered in 1949,6 the
Conseil d'etat has gone one step further-and probably the last
step-by holding the state liable for personal faults committed by
agents acting outside the scope of their authority. In two of the
83. See note 76 supra.
84. [1918] Sirey Recueil 761, cited by MUcH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 76.
85. See the extensive statement by M. Blum, ibid. at 761-71. See also note 9
supra.
86. Dem. Mimeur, Defaux, Besthelsemer, published in R~vut D4 DROIT PUBLIQUt
189 (France 1950).
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three cases, drivers of government vehicles, while on their way
back from their respective official missions, had, for personal reasons and against orders, made detours during which they caused
accidents. In the third case, the driver, instead of waiting for his
superior as he was supposed to do, had taken a ride for his own
pleasure causing an accident. The Conseil d'etat rendered judgment against the government, although previous cases had come
to an opposite result, saying that the accident "ne saurait,dans
les circonstances de l'affaire, 6tre regard6 comme depourvu de
tout lien avec le service," because it happened "t l'occasion due
service et du fait d'un vehicule qui avait t6 confi6 d son conducteur pour l'ex6cution d'un service public." It seems that the principle underlying these cases has its roots in the pronouncement of
M. Blum just quoted that if the means and instruments to commit
the fault have been put at the disposition of the official by the service, state liability will be incurred.
The second group of cases just discussed indicates a highly important development in the over-all picture of the French law of public
tort liability. It should be remembered that the basic concept of liability
of the state, faute de service, was anonymous in character and thus completely disregarded the particular wrongful act of the government agent.
Here, however, a novel kind of liability appears, namely liability of the
state for the personal faults of its agents. The most convincing exT
planation of the nature of this liability seems to be given by WalineI
who puts the state into the position of a guarantor for damages arising
out of personal faults of its agents committed either within or outside
the scope of their authority and irrespective of the presence of faute de
service. From there Waline goes on to say that not only in these cases
but also where the government is responsible for a faute de service,
liability of the state is based on a guarantee given by the state to its
citizens. Faults can, according to Waline, be committed only by human
beings. Thus, the state as a fictitious person cannot commit a wrong,
but necessarily has to act through its agents. Therefore, whenever the
state has been held liable, either for a faute de service or for the personal fault of its agents, it has been held so in its capacity as a guarantor.
Without going into any discussion of this thesis of one of the leading French writers on administrative law, it should be emphasized that
the cases which held the state responsible for personal fault of employees
have led the development of public tort liability close to its original
starting point, namely the provisions of the civil code, especially section 1384. In the same way that the Blanco case had originally moved
87. WALIN,, op. cit. supra note 56, at 589.
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public tort liability away from private tort law, later cases, especially the
Lemonnier case, in situations where no faute de service could be established, have gone in the opposite direction to subjecting the state to one
of the private tort law rules, namely, the rule of respondeat superior.
The French law, insofar as it imposes liability on the state for personal faults of its employees, takes the same position as the FTCA and
German law. There as we have seen, liability of the state for its own
fault is an unknown concept. It is the personal fault of a particular
employee for which the state is responsible after it has taken over this
liability. However, French law admits the possibility of suing both the
state and the employee,8 s which under American and German law is impossible. This has been clearly established by section 2676 of the FTCA,
reading:
"The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this
title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant,
by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the
government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim."
The same rule applies under German law, although in an exceptional
case, where the official had intentionally and contra bonos mores inflicted damages on private persons, the Bundesgerichtshof8 9 has held that
under the doctrine of abuse of rights the official cannot escape personal
liability by pointing to the liability of the state."
A separate question, not to be discussed here at any length, is
whether a state can in turn recover from the employee who had originally caused the damage once it has been held liable and paid damages to
the injured citizen. Under Article 34 of the German Federal Constitution, the state can, in cases where the employee has acted intentionally
or with gross negligence, seek indemnity from him for the amount
paid to the injured person. In France, the Conseil d']Jtat"1 in 1951
overruled previous decisions by establishing the doctrine followed since
then 92 that the state can require restitution from the official if the latter
has committed a personal fault; where both faute de service and per93
sonal fault are present, an opportionment of the damages takes place.
94
In the United States, the Supreme Court in United States v. Gilman
has answered the same question in the negative holding that in the
88. This does not mean that the injured person can recover twice. See

WALINe,

op. cit. supra note 56, at 590.

89. BGHZ 3/94, 104 (1951).
90. An additional reason for the decision was that the state, namely the former
Reich, had ceased to exist and thus could not be sued any longer.
91. Laurelle, Delville, 1951, cited by ScHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 57, at 285.
92. Carion, 1953, cited by SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 57, at 287.
93. Delville, 1951, cited in SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 57, at 285.
94. 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
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absence of a statutory authorization the government has no right of
indemnity against an employee whose negligence has made it liable for
damages.
Since injured individuals in almost all cases prefer to sue the state,
and since by this rule the fear of personal liability is taken away, it would
seem that the French and German solution in making the employee
subject to restitution to the state and thus creating a check on his activities is more adequate than the solution under the Gilman case. This is
true even though section 2680(h) of the FTCA exempts claims arising
out of a number of wilful torts (e.g., assault, battery and false imprisonment). It seems that the employee should be made liable in some form or
other not only in these cases, but also where negligence, or at least where
gross negligence is involved. Thus, under the FTCA and the holding
of the Gilman case, an effective check on the employee of a pecuniary
nature is, at least for the area of negligence, lacking.
F. Two Important Exceptions to Public
Tort Liability Under the FTCA.
(1) The discretionary-function exception. The most important
and also the most controversial exception to the operation of the FTCA
is the discretionary-function exception of section 2680(a)
"The provisions of this chapter... shall not apply to a) any
claim ...

based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to

exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused."
The leading case in this area, Dalehite v. United States, 5 arose
out of the Texas City disaster in 1947. A ship loaded with fertilizer
which had been produced and was about to be shipped overseas as part
of the government foreign aid program, exploded in the harbor of Texas
City, killing 560 persons, injuring 3000 and causing property damages
of about 200 million dollars. Suit was brought under the FTCA and
the district court found negligence in manufacture in four respects the bagging temperature of the fertilizer, the type of bagging (paper),
the labeling (no warning of explosive nature) and in coating the grains.
On appeal, the government contended that the discretionary-function
exception applied, whereas plaintiffs argued that even though discretion
might have been involved in the adoption of the fertilizer program, no
95. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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such discretion was present in its execution. The Supreme Court accepted the contention of the government with the following words:
"It is unnecessary to define . . .precisely where discretion
ends. It is enough to hold . . . that the discretionary function or
duty that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act
includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It
also includes determinations made by executives or administrators
in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations.
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying
out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable."'
"The acts found to have been negligent (i.e. by the district
court) were thus performed under the direction of a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation of plan-making
authority from the apex of the Executive Department. ' ..
The court then introduced a distinction which in later cases has been
held to be the decisive criterion for the application of the discretionaryfunction exception:
"In short, the alleged 'negligence' does not subject the Government to liability. The decisions held culpable were all responsibly
made at a planning rather than operational level and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the
Government's fertilizer program.""
The court in its opinion also pointed to the legislative history of
section 2680(a) which indicates that the FTCA was not designed to
subject the government to liability arising out of authorized activities
like flood control or irrigation projects but that its main objective was
to make the government responsible for ordinary common-law torts,
especially negligence in the operation of vehicles. This statement provoked the remark by the dissenters that accepting this position would
mean that the FTCA merely amended the old and discredited rule that
the king can do no wrong, now to be read, the king can do only little
wrongs.9 9
However, neither the dissenters in the Dalehite case nor later cases
attacked the statement of the majority that decisions made at the plan96. Id. at 35-36.
97. Id. at 39-40.
98. Id. at 42.
99. Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting, joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice

Frankfurter, Id. at 47. 60.
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ning level necessarily involve discretion and can therefore not form the
basis of governmental liability. The point on which the dissent was
based was that the acts found by the district court to have been performed negligently were acts not on the planning but on the operational
level:
"... [A] policy adopted in the exercise of an immune discre-

tion was carried out carelessly by those in charge of detail. We
cannot agree that all the way down the line there is immunity for
every balancing of care against cost, of safety against production,
of warning against silence."'
The question first raised by the dissenters as to the borderline between activities on a planning and activities on an operational level,
i.e., the question where the discretion envisaged by section 2680(a)
ends; and where governmental liability begins was taken up by later
cases. The two most prominent ones in this line are the Indian Towing
case and Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co. In the Indian Towing
case,' 0 ' plaintiffs had alleged negligence of the Coast Guard in the
operation of a light house. The court, implicitly basing its decision on
the distinction between planning and operational level activities, held:
"The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service.
But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light

. . .

and en-

gendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was
obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept
in good working order ...If the Coast Guard failed in its duty

and damage was thereby caused to petitioners,
the United States
0 2
is liable under the Tort Claims Act.'1

In Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co.,' 0 3 a government control
tower operator had cleared two planes for the same time and the same
runway which resulted in a collision of the planes. The government
contended that the operator's duties in clearing planes involved the
exercise of discretion and judgment, with the result that the United
States could not be held liable. The court held that "the discretion was
exercised when it was decided to operate the tower, but the tower personnel had no discretion to operate it negligently."' 4 The tower operator was thus thought to be handling operational details only which
are outside the area of the discretionary-function exception. Otherwise,
100. Id. at 58.
101. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
102. Id. at 69.
103. 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1954), aff'd per curiamn sub nor. United States v.

Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
104. Id. at 77.
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reasoned the court, one could even argue that a mail truck driver who
runs through a red traffic light could not create governmental liability
because he is in a way exercising discretion as to how to drive.
A case decided previously by a court of appeals"' may serve as
another illustration: the wife of a member of the armed forces had been
admitted to an army hospital. In the course of the treatment, she
received a wrong injection which caused great injury to her health.
The government, in the ensuing proceedings for damages, claimed that
the hospital personnel was performing discretionary functions in the
treatment of the plaintiff. The court rejected this argument by saying:
"Having decided that there were facilities available, and having admitted her for treatment, the hospital authorities no longer
had any discretion to exercise with regard to whether she was
receiving careful or negligent treatment."' 0 6
The doctrine of the Indian Towing and Eastern Air Lines cases
has been followed by other decisions of the courts of appeals.'" 7 All of
these read together with the Dalehite decision reveal the following situation which seems to be the present state of law concerning the discretionary-function exception: the government is not liable for negligence
in taking decisions on a planning level. Decisions on a planning level
are those which determine the initiation of governmental programs and
operations and the broad principles to be followed in their execution,
and these decisions are usually made by higher authorities in the executive branch of the government. The discretionary-function exception
of the FTCA does not apply to negligent acts committed on an operational level even if those acts involve a certain amount of discretion.
Acts performed on an operational level are those designed to execute
details in the framework of the governmental program. However, it
should be noted that any attempt to establish certain rules on the basis
of such a limited number of cases as have been decided in this area must
necessarily have its weakness. It is up to the courts, in the course of
deciding cases arising in the future, to give more color to the doctrine
and to create safe criteria for the inherently vague distinction between
planning and operational-level activities.
In France and Germany the problem of tort liability of the state
for acts in the exercise of which discretion is involved has presented
105. Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950) ; another case prior
to Indian Towing and Eastern Airlines was Somerset Seafood v. United States, 193
F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951).
106. 181 F.2d 723, 725 (5th Cir. 1950).
107. Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956); Fair v. United
States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
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itself under different aspects. The primary question has been how far
courts should go in scrutinizing whether discretion granted to the administration has been exercised in the right way. Certainly, no such
sweeping exception as the one under the FTCA, that no tort claim
can be brought whenever discretion is involved, is known to French
or German law. Likewise unknown is the distinction between acts on
a planning and on an operational level, although acts of state (actes du
gouvernement), like for instance the declaration of war, have traditionally been exempt from judicial review.
The problem in France and Germany is essentially one of separation of powers. In both countries it is believed that the public administration should have a certain amount of freedom in order to fulfill its
functions effectively. Therefore, discretion is granted to the administration for certain groups of cases, thus giving it the power to subject
the decision of these cases to such considerations as it thinks to be most
important and in the interest of the general public. Thus, the administration is entitled to decide a given case in one or the other way, both
solutions being equally lawful as long as no transgressions beyond the
limits of the granted area of discretion occurs. By granting discretion,
it is understood that the administration shall to that extent have complete freedom and that courts shall not, either in annulment or in tort
proceedings, encroach upon this area. In wise self-restraint the courts
in both countries (i.e., the Conseil d'Itat in France; in Germany the
ordinary courts in the area of public tort liability and the administrative courts in annulment proceedings) have accepted this interpretation and refrained from substituting their own judgment as to how discretion should be exercised for that of the administration.
In the field of public tort liability, neither in France nor in Germany is there any written law on this subject. Nevertheless, the courts
in both countries have held that they would not inquire whether the
discretion given to the administration should have been exercised in a
different way. Thus, in the Leca case,1" 8 the Conseil d' tat dismissed a tort claim which had been based on the refusal by the
administration to grant a permit, basing its decision on the fact that
the issuance of this permit was a discretionary matter. The same
principle has been applied in a large number of cases by the German
Reichsgericht and the Bundesgerichtshof. 0
Tort claims against the government have, however, been allowed
both in France and in Germany where the discretion given to the administration has been abused. This seems to be the most important dis108. [1942] Recuejl 160, cited in Jacoby, supra note 76, at 266.
109. See, for example, RGZ 138/6, 14; BGHZ 4/302, 311.
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tinction in this field between the law of the FTCA on the one hand
where not even abuse of discretion can lead to public tort liability, and
the French and German law on the other. In these laws it is by now
a firmly established rule that whenever there is an abuse of discretion
on the part of the administration or one of its officials, state liability
is incurred.
In France, this result has been reached by applying the theory of
d~tournement de pouvoir, which exists whenever an administrative
authority uses its discretionary powers for other than the purposes envisaged by the statute. D~tournement de pouvoir is present if a decision involving discretion, although the reasons advanced may seem
perfectly legitimate, is in reality based on personal or political considerations, for instance the personal interest of the deciding official or
that of one of his friends, a feeling of revenge, the desire to inflict
damages on a political opponent, or to discriminate against members
of a minority group. If for instance a government employee denies a
liquor license, which may or may not be granted, because the applicant
is his personal enemy, basing his decision on some valid reason, a case
of d~tournement de pouvoir is present. Thus, it is one of the characteristics of d~tournement de pouvoir that a decision is on its face perfectly valid and lawful but that the reasons which actually led to it are
of an improper nature. In cases of this kind, the Conseil d' tat has
held the state liable for faulty exercise of its discretion. Thus, the
Conseil d']Ptat held11 ° that the arrest of persons in 1944, allegedly as
collaborators, but in reality in order to injure these persons in their
careers, was an act of d~tournement de pouvoir for which the state was
liable. The same result was reached in a case where the permission for
the sale of land was refused on improper grounds although the decisions
together with the reasons advanced was on its face valid."'
The German law of tort liability likewise does not exempt abuse
of discretion. The former Reichsgericht as well as the present Bundesgerichtshof have in a long line of cases established the principle that
where a public official has exercised discretion arbitrarily (Emessensmissbrauch) or where he has acted in such a faulty way that his conduct is incompatible with standards to be applied in a well-organized
public administration, the state will be made liable." 2 These decisions
involve essentially the same kind of situations as described above under
French law, i.e., discriminatory denial of licenses or permissions, arbi110. Epoux Larmanjat, [1949] Recueil 454, cited in Jacoby, supra note 76, at 259.
111. Comp. anonyme des Sablieres de la Seine, [1944] Recueil 189, cited in
Jacoby, supra note 76, at 259.
112. RGZ 125/299, 307; 126/164, 269; 159/247, 251; 164/15, 31; 168/143, 164;
BGHZ. 2/209, 214; 4/302, 310, 311.
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trary taking of property where some taking of property may be justified, arbitrary arrests by police officers, and so on.
Thus, as we have seen, two major distinctions exist in the area of
public tort liability for acts where discretion is involved. Under the
letter of the FTCA, the courts are completely barred from basing
governmental liability on acts in the performance of which discretion
has been used. Courts in France and Germany, on the other hand, do
not make any distinction as to whether discretion is involved or not,
with the exception that they will not base liability on the fact that the
discretion has been used in one way rather than in a different way.
The second, even more important distinction is that abuse of discretion
in its various manifestations cannot, under the FTCA, lead to governmental liability whereas French and German courts have consistently
come to the opposite result. To what extent the line of cases based on
the distinction between planning and operational level activities which
exempt the latter under section 2680(a) constitutes an approach to the
solution similar to the ones in France and Germany remains to be seen.
It seems that at least on the basis of the existing case material the kind
of discretion exercised on the operational level is not discretion in its
technical meaning of having the power to make a decision one or the
other way. Army doctors, to take one of the cases cited above, do not
have any discretion, as the term is commonly understood, whether to
give the right or the wrong injection. Thus, even insofar as the cases
subject the government to liability for negligence in the exercise of
discretion of this kind, their importance for a development in the direction of the French or German solution is necessarily limited.
(2) Wilfully committed torts. Another important exception from
the operation of the FTCA is that for wilfully committed torts. Section
2680(h) provides that the FTCA shall not apply to "any claim arising
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights."
As Davis.. and Street" 4 have pointed out, no satisfactory reason
can be given for this exception. In fact, only in committee hearings
on earlier bills was any justification attempted, where it was said that
such suits were difficult to defend and might easily result in the award
of excessive damages." 5 Neither reason is convincing, the first one
113. Davis, supra note 31, at 782.
114. Street, supra note 45, at 355.
115. Testimony of A. Holtzoff, representing the Department of Justice before
Hearings on S.2690 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 39 (1940).
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being untenable if one remembers that the purpose of the FTCA was
to abolish the old theory of governmental immunity and at the same
time to make better use of Congressional time and energy." 6 The
second reason loses its force by virtue of the fact that no jury actions
are permitted under the act.
In application of section 2680(h), the courts have held that excessive physical force used by a military police officer," 7 or excessive
interrogation of a civilian by an army sergeant, resulting in temporary
insanity,"18 come under the assault exception.

It should be noted that the statutory exception does not cover all
wilfully committed acts. Trespass or conversion, for instance, are not
included in the list, so that an illegal search and seizure by federal
authorities may well come under the FTCA. Consequently, in Hatahley
v. United States,"9 the government was held liable on the basis of trespass for the deliberate and wrongful act of destroying horses belonging
to Indian plaintiffs by a ranger.
Apart from this exception, however, the general rule of section
2680(h) is that the government is liable for the smaller wrong when
one of its employees inflict damages on a private person negligently
but not for the larger wrong if the employee did the same thing deliberately - indeed a paradoxical situation.
It is interesting to note that the same situation existed in France
until the beginning of this century. As has been mentioned above,
faute de service and faute personnelle were originally held mutually
exclusive by the Conseil d'iItat. This meant that in those cases
where the employee had acted maliciously, intentionally, with gross
negligence or for personal reasons, the state was not liable although
the employee had acted in the scope of his authority, whereas in
cases not involving a personal fault, the state could be sued. Thus,
the soundness of the victim's claim was in inverse ratio to the gravity of the fault committed, since recovery could be had much more
easily from the state than from the wrongdoing official. Gradually,
it came to be felt that this could not be the right solution of the
problem, that the state should not be freed from liability simply
because the employee had committed an especially grave tort.
116. The FTCA was passed as part IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946 under the topic heading "More Efficient Use of Congressional Time." See
Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 CoL. L.
Rrv. 722, 726 (1947).
117. Lewis v. United States, 194 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1952).
118. United States v. Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950).
119. 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
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Since 1909120 this old theory has not been applied. The possibility of a
coexistence of liability of the employee for personal fault and of the state
for faute de service is now firmly established.1 2'
VII.
TORT LIABILITY
AND

OF THE

EUROPEAN

COAL

STEEL COMMUNITY.

Great stress has been put in this Article on the basic distinctions
between French and American law in the area of public tort liability,
and little has been said about the law governing the Coal and Steel
Community. This finds its justification in the fact that the Treaty
constituting the Coal and Steel Community has, with regard to a solution of the problem of public tort liability, followed the general pattern
of the French law. As has been outlined in the introductory part, basic
features of the French law, for instance the distinction between faute de
service and faute personnelle and the lack of a uniform standard for
the degree of fault, have been taken over by the Treaty. So far, no
decisions have been rendered by the Court of Justice which concern tort
liability of the Community. Since we would therefore, as far as the
available material goes, have been limited to the bare provisions of the
Treaty and the comments of some legal writers who have dealt with
this subject, it seems advisable to go to some length into an analysis
of the law on which the Community law is based and to refer at this
point to this analysis.
However, as the result of the peculiar nature of the Community,
there do exist a number of characteristics which, both procedurally and
in substance, distinguish the law of public tort liability of the Community from French law.
VIII.
NEW

DEVELOPMENTS

UNDER THE TREATY.

A. Distinction Between Tortious Acts of a
General Nature and Acts Performed
by the High Authority.
The most important feature under the Treaty is the separate regulation of liability for tortious acts of a general nature on the one hand,
and measures taken by the High Authority (HA) which inflict dam120. Starting with the decision of the Conseil d'Atat in Compagnie Commerciale
de Colonisation du Congo, Rec. 1909, 153, cited by MucH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 75.
121. Thus, recovery has been granted in cases of assault. Sinapi, Rec. 1938, 331
(brutality of police officer), arbitrary arrest and dentention, Br6card, Rec. 1949, 515,
Durand-Dastes and Biziere, Rec. 1950, 191; all cases cited in Jacoby, supra note 76,
at 252.
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ages on coal and steel enterprises on the other hand. In French law,
no distinction has been made as to the level in the governmental hierarchy on which a tortious act has been committed if we disregard the
actes du gouvernement. This is quite different under the provisions of
the Treaty. Reference has been made above to the important role of
the HA, which is the most powerful organ in the Community. This
peculiar position of the HA has led to a special treatment of its acts for
purposes of public tort liability.
The general provision on which tort liability of the Community is
based is Article 40(1):
"Subject to the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 34
[providing specifically for the consequences of annulment of certain acts of the HA], the Court shall have jurisdiction to assess
damages against the Community, at the request of the injured
party, in cases where injury results from a fault involved in an
official act 22 of the Community in execution of the present Treaty."
This article, essentially based on French law, does not present any novel
questions. It establishes tort liability of the Community for acts which
arise out of the defective functioning of the Community's administrative machinery and can be invoked by everyone who has been injured.
Article 40(1) does not apply to acts of the HA. A special provision, article 34, has been inserted into the Treaty which deals with
tort claims based on a decision or recommendation' 2" issued by the HA:
"(1) If the Court should annul a decision or recommendation of the High Authority, the matter shall be remanded to the
High Authority. The latter must take the necessary measures in
order to give effect to the judgment of annulment. In case a decision or recommendation is adjudged by the Court to involve a
fault for which the Community is liable, and causes a direct and
particular injury to an enterprise or a group of enterprises, the
High Authority must take such measures, within the powers
granted to it by the present Treaty, as will assure an equitable
redress for the injury resulting directly from the decision or recommendation which has been annulled, and, to the extent necessary,
must grant a reasonable indemnity.
(2) If the High Authority fails to take within a reasonable
period the measures required to give effect to a judgment of annulment, an appeal for damages may be brought before the Court."
122. This is the translation of faute de service.

123. The HA, in the execution of its responsibilities, issues decisions, recom-

mendations and opinions. Decisions are binding in all their details; recommendations
are binding as to the objectives which they specify but leave the choice of appropriate
means for attaining these objectives to the particular enterprise or enterprises concerned; opinions are not binding at all. See Article 14 of the Treaty.
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This provision, together with Article 33 regulating the annulment
procedure, forms a completely new approach to public tort liability.
Neither under the French nor under the German or American system
is there any requirement that the administrative act that caused the
damage be annulled before a tort suit against the government can be
started. 2 4 According to Article 34 of the Treaty, on the other hand,
damages arising out of a wrongful act of the HA cannot be asked for
unless that act has in a previous annulment procedure been set aside.
This does not mean that the annulment automatically brings about
liability of the Community. The procedure of article 33 is merely an
immediate remedy to prevent further injurious effects of the act contested. In order to recover damages, the enterprise must establish the
existence of an additional factor, namely fault on the part of the HA.
Thus, the requirements for obtaining damages are more difficult to
satisfy than those for obtaining the annulment.
This compulsory procedure, whose mere existence constitutes an
impediment to tort suits, brings about other limitations on the liability
of the Community. Thus, a suit cannot be started at all by a single
enterprise or an association of enterprises against general decisions
unless an abuse of the discretion by the HA affecting them can be
proved. In no case can recovery be had if the suit for annulment has
been dismissed or if the statute of limitations of one month provided
for by article 33(3) has run out. In these two situations, no resort
can later be taken to article 40(1) alleging that the mere existence
of the decision constitutes a faute de service. This results not only from
the first words of article 40, but also from the general attitude of the
Treaty that acts of the HA should exclusively be adjudged by the
special provisions of articles 33 and 34.125

A further limitation on Community tort liability is that under
article 34 where only a single enterprise or a group of enterprises, and
124. In Germany, legal provisions of the Laender which required a special administrative procedure designed to determine whether the administrative act was
illegal before a tort action against the government could be brought, has been abolished by art. 131 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. See Forsthoff, Lehrbuch des
Verwaltungsrecht, in I ALLGEMEINIR TtIL 249 (Band ed. 1953). It should be noted
however, that both in France and Germany the individual will, as a practical matter,
start a proceeding parallel to the tort action, aimed at the annulment of the administrative act, in cases where this act continues to affect him in an adverse manner,
e.g., if the administration continues to withhold a license which has been illegally
taken away. In these cases an ordinary court in Germany will usually stay the proceedings until the administrative court has decided over the legality or illegality of
the administrative act. In France, the Conseil d'ttat has jurisdiction both in annulment and in tort proceedings.
125. RAPPORT D8 LA DfLtGATION FRANqAISE SUR LETRAITt INSTITUANT LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPkNl DU CHARBON ET DP L'ACIPR 40 (1951).
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third parties only under certain circumstances, can bring tort actions.
This excludes suits by member states.
These limitations on the liability of the Community for wrongful
decisions and recommendations of the HA-necessity of previous annulment and limited number of claimants both in the annulment and in
the tort procedure - find their explanation in two factors.
The first one, mentioned in the report of the French delegation
participating in the creation of the Treaty,' 2 6 is based on the following
consideration: unlike the situation in a state where it is just that the
entire community bear the pecuniary consequences of a fault committed

against a particular individual, the small number of members of the
Community, i.e., the coal and steel enterprises of the participating
countries, requires a limitation of tort suits against the Community.
The expenses of granting indemnity in a great number of cases would
ultimately fall upon the members of the Community in the form of increased contributions to be paid by them, whereas in a state the burden
can be spread out on a much wider basis and is therefore not felt by
the individual taxpayer. The consequences of fault committed by the
HA would thus, assuming a broad tort liability, not be borne by the
Community itself but by its members. In order to avoid this result as
far as possible, the mentioned restrictions have been imposed.
The same idea can also be found in the requirement that the damage claimed under article 34 be particular to the enterprise. This means
that no claim can be made which is based on a decision of a general
nature affecting all or most of the enterprises of the Community in a
detrimental way, regardless of whether the decision has been annulled
and fault has been established. Otherwise, all injured enterprises could
sue the Community. This would impose immense financial consequences
on the latter and, again in view of the limited number of members,
would eventually lead to their self-indemnification among themselves. 2
The second, and probably even more important factor which has
been stressed 21 for the necessity of limiting tort liability, is that the
HA acts in an unprecedented field of economic cooperation and control where mistakes and false decisions are unavoidable. These might
126. Id. at 38.
127. See MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 50, 64.
128. See note 125 supra; MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 53; Bebr, The European
Coal and Steel Community, 63 YALP L.J. 1, 32 (1953) ; Schlochauer, Die Gerichtsbarkeit der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft fuer Kohle und Stahl, 3 ARCHIV DES VOnLKERR4CHTS §§ 385, 410 (Band ed. 1952). See also Neri, II Ricorso dei PrivatiDavanti
alla Corte di Giustizia della CECA, RIVISTA DI STUDI POLITICI INTURNAZIONALI,
362, 393 (1956) ; Vignes, I Ricorsi Giurisdizionali delle imprese private contro le
decisioni dell' Alta Autorita del Piano Schumann, RIViSTA DI STuI POLITICI INT9RNAZIONALI

657, 669 (1952).
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easily have grave financial consequences, especially hard to be borne by
an institution without substantial means, like the Coal and Steel Community. The idea therefore was not to hamper the initiative of the HA
too much in striking out new paths in the common interest, by considerations of this kind. Furthermore, in an area of fluctuating economic conditions, it was believed to be very difficult to ascertain the
extent of damages, based, by and large, on speculations as to what the
situation might have been if the deficient act had not been undertaken.
The Treaty has thus, as we have seen, taken a new course in
regulating its law of public tort liability. While following French law
in principle, it has created a completely new pattern, both procedurally
and substantively, for the most important group of administrative acts,
namely the decisions and recommendations of the HA. The reasons for
this new development can be traced back to the novel character of the
Community, consisting of a limited number of members, as well as its
novel functions. It is not inconceivable that the success of this solution
may at some future day beocme important for the functioning of the
whole institution.
B. Compulsory Annulment Procedure for Acts
of the High Authority and Its Consequences
for the Liability of the Community.
The procedure to annul a decision or recommendation of the HA
has found its regulation in Article 33 of the Treaty which reads:
"(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction over appeals by a
member state or by the Council for the annulment of decisions and
recommendations of the High Authority on the grounds of lack
of legal competence, substantial procedural violations, violations of
the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or abuse
of power.

...

(2) The enterprise, or the associations referred to in Article
48, shall have the right to appeal on the same grounds against
individual decisions and recommendations concerning them, or
against general decisions and recommendations which they deem
to involve an abuse of power affecting them.
(3) The appeals provided for in the first two paragraphs of
the present article must be taken within one month from the date
of the notification or the publication, as the case may be, of the
decision or recommendation."
Another provision which is important in this connection is article
35, according to which suit can be brought against the implicit negative
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decision of the HA which is presumed to result from its failure to issue a
decision or recommendation to the issuance of which it is obligated
(article 35(1)), or where such failure constitutes an abuse of discretion (article 35(2)).
Without going into the details of the annulment procedure, it
should be noted that suit can be brought not only by member states or
the Council of the Community or enterprises or their associations (to a
limited degree by the latter group against decisions of a general nature),
but also by third persons. Thus, article 63(2) gives the right to bring
an action to a buyer if the HA has found a violation of principles of
free competition and has therefore limited the right of the enterprises
of the Community to deal with this buyer to a degree which may entail
temporary deprivation of access to the market. Likewise, third parties
affected by a deconcentration order of the HA can according to article
66(5) invoke the annulment procedure. Insofar as these persons have
a right to bring about the annulment of a decision of the HA, they must
also be granted the right to recover damages since the Treaty puts them
against their will into a position where they can directly be injured by
illegal acts of the HA.
As a consequence of the separation-of-powers idea, the only act
which the Court can take after it has annulled a decision of the HA is
to remand the matter to the HA. Apart from the question of awarding
damages to the injured party, the HA is then under an obligation to
take the necessary steps in order to give effect to the judgment and
to remove all the consequences which resulted from the annulled decision. For instance, the application for a price increase in coal or steel
products, originally denied by the HA, would have to be granted, money
obtained by virtue of a pecuniary sanction imposed on an enterprise
for disobeying the annulled decision (article 36) would have to be
reimbursed.
However, not all consequences of the wrongful decision can thus
be removed. In the case just mentioned, the particular enterprise
illegally denying a price increase might in the meantime have suffered
considerable damages. For these situations, article 34(1) lists as one
of the obligations of the HA the taking of measures which will assure
an equitable redress for the damages suffered and the granting, so far
as necessary, of a reasonable indemnity. An important requirement
for such action on the part of the HA is that the annulled decision
shall have been adjudged by the Court to involve a fault for which the
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Community is liable. 129 The mere annulment which establishes only
the illegal character of the decision does not automatically bring about
tort liability of the Community.1 ° Either in the annulment procedure
or in a separate subsequent procedure, the Court must have found fault
on the part of the HA. Fault in this connection is, as in French law,
fault of the HA as an administrative unit and not the specific personal
fault of any one of its members.
The solution of article 34(1) bears in itself another novel feature
in the field of public tort liability. Whereas under the national systems
discussed above a claimant can immediately seek a declaration by the
courts as to the existence of tort liability of the state; article 34(1)
gives the right to determine, in the first instance, whether an injury
has been suffered and what the reparation shall be, to the HA.'
A
claimant has therefore to await this decision of the HA. Only after the
latter has failed to act within a reasonable period of time or has awarded
damages which the claimant deems insufficient, can he proceed before
the Court of Justice.
Dispute has arisen between the legal writers as to what steps a
claimant should take if the HA fails to act. Can he invoke article 34(2)
directly, or does he have to attack the implicit decision of refusal under
article 35 first? Valentine 3 2 has defended the latter position, whereas
other writers 1" would allow the immediate invocation of article 34(2).
This provision talks about the measures required to give effect to a
judgment of annulment. Since the granting of equitable redress and
reasonable indemnity is one of those required steps, the refusal to act
accordingly would, contrary to the view of Valentine, make article
34(2) immediately applicable.
More complicated is the procedure if the HA has given some
reparation but the enterprise maintains that it is entitled to more. Since
this is not a failure to act, the way indicated by Valentine seems to
be the only possible one that the enterprise has to challenge the de129. The French text reads: ". . .dcision . . . entachie d'une faute a engager
la responsabilitd de la Communaut ......
"-a
formula which we found previously
in French law and which gives the Court the necessary freedom to decide each case
on its own merits.
130. See e.g., the conclusions of the general counsel in affaire no. 1/55, Recueil,
vol. 2, 1955, 1956, 31, 48.
131. The possibility of reaching an agreement with the administration under
the national systems is not a counterpart to the procedure under Article 34(1) of
the Treaty, since the injured person is under no obligation to seek such an agreement.
132. VALENTINE, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 89-90 (1955).
133. MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 66; Muench, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in Schumann-Plan, FESTSCHRIFT FUER RUDOLF LAUN, 123, 137 (1953) ; Antoine, La Cour
de Justice de la C.E.C.A. et la Cour Internationale de Justice, 57 REvUE GENERALE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIQUE 210, 238 (1953).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss2/2

44

Kautzor-Schroeder: Public Tort Liability under the Treaty Constituting the European
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 4: p. 198

cision granting inadequate damages in an annulment procedure, alleging

that the HA has violated article 34(1) which requires equitable reparation. If, upon annulment, the HA refuses to grant further reparation,
suit could be brought under article 34(2).
It seems advisable to make clear that article 34 contains two dif-

ferent bases for tort liability. The first one, laid down in article 34(2),
applies whenever the HA has failed to take the necessary steps to give
effect to an annulment judgment. The other one, article 34(1) last
sentence, applies where the illegal act of the HA itself, before its annulment, has caused damage to an enterprise.
C. Nature of Damages.
We have seen that Article 34(1) of the Treaty gives the HA the
right to determine, in the first instance, whether and to what extent
an enterprise has been damaged by an annulled decision. This makes
the HA the judge over its own wrongful acts, but at the same time puts
it also beyond the reach of the separation-of-powers doctrine. It allows
a kind of reparation which is not limited to the granting of money damages. Under the national systems, the idea of separation of powers
has led to the rule that the courts cannot issue orders directing the
administration to grant a specific kind of redress, but that all they can
do is award money damages.' This principle does not apply to article
34(1). Under this provision, the HA has the authority to grant equitable redress to an injured enterprise in whatever form it deems most
advisable. If for instance the annulled decision of the HA had prohibited an investment program by an enterprise, as a consequence of
which the latter has been denied a loan by an investment company,
equitable redress would be the granting of a loan by the Community
itself. The difficulty of granting equitable redress in this area would,
as Much 135 points out, even justify a practice under which advantages
are granted to the injured enterprise in one area although the injury
has been inflicted in another area. All suitable measures which grant
equitable redress can be used.
Only in cases where reparation of this kind is impossible may
money damages be awarded by the HA. This is indicated by the words
of the provision that to the extent necessary reasonable indemnity must
be granted.
134. For the United States, see U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952), giving the District
Courts exclusive jurisdiction in actions against the United States ". . . for money
damages. . . ." For Germany, see RGZ 150/140, 143; 169/353, 356; BGHZ 4/302.
For the situation in France, see Street, op. cit. supra note 80, 62.
135. MUCH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 66.
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The principle of article 34(1) in regard to the nature of damages
to be awarded does not apply to article 34(2). Since here the reparation of injuries is not entrusted to the same organ which had originally
caused them, but to the Court of Justice, the doctrine of separation of
powers again applies so that only money damages can be recovered.
The same is true for tort claims brought against the Community under
Article 40 which are also decided by the Court.
D. The Problem of Combination of Liabilities.
Combination of fault and thus combination of liabilities can arise
only under the provision of Article 40 of the Treaty. The term fault
as it is used by article 34 is, as has been said before, in the nature of
faute de service of the HA. Personal faults committed by individual
members of the HA are completely disregarded by this provision.
Article 40(1) makes the Community responsible in cases where
faute de service exists together with personal fault, irrespective of
whether the employee has acted within the scope of his employment
or not. To this extent, the situation is exactly the same as under
French law.
A novel aspect is introduced by article 40(2) for cases where
only personal fault is present and this has occurred in the performance
of the employee's duties. 186 French law, it will be remembered, assumed
in cases of this kind, apart from the personal liability of the employee,
liability of the state under a theory of guarantee (Lemonnier case).
The solution of article 40(2), however, is different:
"It [i.e., the Court of Justice] shall also have jurisdiction
to assess damages against any official or employee of the Community, in cases where injury results from a personal fault of such
official or employee in the performance of his duties. If the injured party is unable to recover such damages from such official
or employee, the Court may assess an equitable indemnity against
the Community."
The essential differences between this provision and the French
law are threefold:
1. The Community is liable only if no recovery can be had from
the wrongdoing official, for instance if he is insolvent or if he does not
live any more under the jurisdiction of the Court (i.e., in one of the
member states).
2. The power of the Court to assess damages against the Community is a discretionary one. In other words, the Court does not have
136. If the employee has acted outside of the scope of his authority, no liability
of the Community can arise. Article 40(3) of the Treaty.
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to impose liability on the Community but may do so in its discretion.
3. If liability is imposed on the Community, the indemnity to be
paid does not have to be full, but merely equitable indemnity. Again,
it is in the discretion of the Court to what extent the Community should
be required to make reparation to an injured person.
This solution certainly lags behind those which we have encountered under the national laws. There, although based on different
theories, primary and full liability of the states for personal faults of
their agents has in practice been established. But in spite of motions
made by German delegates to the judicial committee during the creation of the Treaty to follow the French law on this point,"3 7 article
40(2) has gone a different way. The reasons for this probably lie in
the general tendency of the Treaty to limit liability of the Community
to an absolute minimum. It remains to be seen whether the Court will
accept this tendency or whether it will, by way of judicial interpretation, for instance by widening the scope of the notion of faute de service
in article 40(1), introduce a broader tort liability in the interest of
injured persons than that which was envisaged by the Treaty.
137. See Mucir, op. cit. supra note 18, at 79.
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